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(Una lógica dialógica libre para el razonamiento subrogativo:  
generación de hipótesis sin compromisos ontológicos)
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ABSTRACT: This article aims to present a Free Dialogic Logic [FDL] as a general framework for hypo-
thesis generation in the practice of modelling in science. Our proposal is based on the idea that the infe-
rential function that models fulfil during the modelling process (surrogate reasoning) should be carried 
out without ontological commitments. The starting point to achieve our objective is that the scientific 
consideration of models without a target is a symptom that, on the one hand, the Applicability of Logic 
should be considered among the conditions of adequacy that should take into account all modeling pro-
cess and, on the other, that the inferential apparatus at the base of the surrogate reasoning process must 
be rid of realistic assumptions that lead to erroneous conclusions. In this sense, we propose as an alterna-
tive an ontologically neutral inferential system in the perspective of dialogical pragmatism.
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RESUMEN: El presente artículo tiene como objetivo presentar una Lógica Dialógica Libre [FDL] como 
marco general para la generación de hipótesis en la práctica de la modelización en ciencia. Nuestra propuesta 
parte de la idea de que la función inferencial que cumplen los modelos durante el proceso de modelización (ra-
zonamiento subrogativo) debe realizarse sin compromisos ontológicos. El punto de partida para lograr nuestro 
objetivo es que la consideración de modelos sin objetivo (targetless models) es síntoma de que, por un lado, la 
Aplicabilidad de la Lógica debe ser considerada entre las condiciones de adecuación que debe tener en cuenta 
todo proceso de modelación y, por otro lado, que el aparato inferencial en la base del proceso de razonamiento 
subrogativo debe deshacerse de suposiciones realistas que conducen a conclusiones erróneas. En este sentido, 
proponemos como alternativa un sistema inferencial ontológicamente neutro en la perspectiva del pragma-
tismo dialógico.
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1. Introduction
The objective of the present article is to propose a Free Dialogical Logic (FDL henceforth) 
that addresses the logical problems that arise when the generation of scientific hypotheses 
correspond to portions of the world whose existence is uncertain or debatable. In particu-
lar, we will focus on cases when we must infer scientific hypotheses from models that point 
to that kind of portions of the world.1 Thus, if a model should allow us to generate hypoth-
eses about ontologically uncertain phenomena, which is identified as the target in the gen-
eralized literature, our point is that the applicability of logic must be considered between 
the conditions of adequacy and that the generation of hypothesis should be done only from 
a logical framework that takes into account this feature. The latter considerably restricts 
our interest to those modeling cases, where the ontologically uncertain phenomena, due 
to their unclear status, justify the denomination of targetless cases. Therefore, the question 
that guides our work is which is the most adequate inferential frame for the generation of 
hypotheses from models about ontologically controversial portions of the world. And ac-
cording to this, we aim to propose and justify, within the framework of dialogical pragma-
tism, a proof system without ontological commitments, suitable for targetless cases.
2. Targetless and Ontology
The notion of targetless models is recognized in the general literature (cf. Frigg and Nguyen, 
2017) as one of the conditions of adequacy that any modeling approach must satisfy in or-
der to be suitable. The notion points to the fact that the modeling process is carried out 
without a target or portion of the world (phenomena) to which the model points. Indeed, 
we believe that this explanation of a modeling process with an absent target is not very pre-
cise. Moreover, at first sight, it seems nonsensical, given the subrogating condition that 
models possess: a model is always the model of something2. However, we can try to under-
stand this absence in the following way: targetless could happen either because models do 
not require a target, or because the model assumes that there should be a portion of the 
world but it is not or does not exist. The first vision, for example, corresponds to the so-
called ‘toy models’ according to Luczak (2017). In this article, we will focus on the inferen-
tial issues of the latter two. That is, from a logical point of view, how is it possible to have a 
model without a target, if reasoning generated from models must yield claims about the tar-
get of the models (the phenomena).
So, what does it mean then at first sight that we have a modeling process, but there is 
no target to which the model is addressed? Where does the information about the absence 
1 Our proposed use of FDL is not exclusive to the modeling process. Extending the requirement of a 
neutral logic to the other scientific domains of hypothesis generation (abduction, etc.) is a task for a fu-
ture article.
2 For example, in a perspective that defends an epistemic point of view for the representational function 
of models and denies a demarcation criterion, all objects attain this new double condition at the mo-
ment they are invested with the condition of being modeling something. This double condition, that 
of being itself and at the same time being something else is achieved according to each approach to the 
notion of representation (similarity, morphism, being in the place of, inferential point of view, etc.).
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of a target come from? At first, the targetless’s condition of a model seems to be the result 
of the confrontation of a datum (the absence of T) with a complete process, but not neces-
sarily null. Indeed, it is considered that targetless is not a clause to invalidate modeling pro-
cesses. In this regard, we believe that there are in general two options: either we deny that 
the target could not exist (we deny targetless), or we try to explain what happens. We dis-
tance ourselves from the first position because we consider it to be anti-intuitive. We be-
lieve that there are numerous cases of successful models, even though we know that the 
target they are aiming at, does not exist or it is not as described by the model (for example, 
when we appeal to the planetary model of the atom to explain Coulomb’s law, even though 
we know that this is not the reference of the word ‘atom’). Thus stated, targetless is not 
considered a hypothesis, a condition, or a presupposition, but a fact that results from ex-
perimental corroboration (sometimes a fortiori). We mean, “the targetless condition” of 
the model is not part of any process of modeling. And from a logical point of view, which is 
the purpose of the present article, there seems to be no special consideration of any kind re-
garding the generation of hypotheses, whether it is done from an unrealistic model (models 
of ether, phlogiston, etc.), or a shark model for hydrodynamic studies (model of a real shark 
for submarine engineering). Especially regarding the ontological status of what those mod-
els point to. For this reason, we believe that it is worth introducing a distinction between 
this approach of targetless, which we will call static, and the point of view that aims to inte-
grate the absence of the target in the process of generating hypotheses and that we will call 
dynamic. We will develop the latter in point 5.
In general, the absence of a target triggers at least two kinds of problems: one is episte-
mological and concerns scientific realism. The second is logical and points to the inferen-
tial function of the model, i.e., the generation of hypotheses about a portion of the world 
(the target of the model).
3. Modeling and realism: where is the target?
The scientific realism to which we refer, as Chakravarty (2017) points out, is a positive 
epistemic attitude toward the content of our best theories and models. Indeed, this epis-
temic attitude results in beliefs in different aspects of the world described by the sciences. 
We also consider relevant to our work realistic approaches that focus on the following 
aspect: the successful reference of theoretical terms to things in the world, both observ-
able and unobservable. And this presupposes the metaphysical dimension of realism: the 
mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences. And although this 
is an uncommon position in contemporary theoretical developments —as Chakravarty 
points out—, it reveals a maxim that governs —from our point of view— all scientific re-
alism: Science aims to give a literally true account of the world or reality. The latter, in 
turn, leads us to the epistemological dimension of it, that is, that the totality of knowl-
edge of the world is the set of scientific theoretical claims (interpreted literally as de-
scribing an independent world or reality). How could we then have knowledge accord-
ing to the realistic approaches, if the target system does not exist? The latter is indeed a 
serious problem. Even more so if we take into account, from the perspective of scientific 
representation, all the theoretical commitments underlying the different approaches. 
For example, if we consider the similarity and structuralist conceptions. One reaction to 
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these problems is the anti-realist approaches that distance themselves from the notion of 
representation.
However, the aim of our article is not to contribute to this debate. In effect, although 
the notion of targetless challenges the realist commitments of theories, our aim here is not 
to postulate an anti-realistic or antirepresentationalistic approach to modeling, but to an-
alyse the realist presuppositions present in the inferential function that models perform 
(surrogate reasoning) and their consequences.
4. Targetless and applicability of logic: surrogate reasoning
Surrogate reasoning is the name given to the process of generating hypothesis in the prac-
tice of modeling. The term was introduced by Swoyer (1991, p. 449) and, as Frigg and 
Nguyen point out, is about reasoning conducted on models that yield claims about their 
targets (2017, p. 51). We assume from this definition that it is a logical process. The hy-
pothesis generated still remains —as in the most epistemological approaches— a tentative 
assumption or concession made for the sake of argument in order to draw out and test its 
logical or empirical consequences. Our aim here is to point out that the ontological presup-
positions of scientific realism present in the underlying logic of surrogate reasoning lead to 
erroneous conclusions —of which targetless is a symptom— and should therefore be aban-
doned.3 For symptoms, we mean an anomaly that requires a new perspective.
It is important to note that, from our point of view, as we pointed out above, we are 
not considering models as prescribing what reality is like. Instead, it is about modeling to 
understand what reality is like or how it works. In these cases, surrogate reasoning consists 
of generating hypotheses from the model and then testing them experimentally (directly 
and indirectly), in the portion of the world where the model is focused. The success of the 
latter depends, among other things, on the degree of accuracy with which the model relates 
to the portion of reality at which it is aimed (and according to the chosen theoretical per-
spective). Indeed, it can be seen that the modeling process as a whole (including recogni-
tion of a problematic portion of reality, elaboration of a model, measurement, testing, data 
collection, etc.), goes beyond the surrogate reasoning function of the model. But reasoning 
conducted on models is a crucial factor in determining whether the model is adequate or 
not.
Thus, surrogate reasoning, as a condition for models, does not mean that we are deal-
ing with a new kind of generation of hypothesis. What is new, according to our point of 
view, is that we are addressing a dynamic and interactive frame where the model and the 
targeted portion of reality exchange information4.
Now, we will focus on highlighting the problems of choosing an ontologically 
non-neutral logic as the basis for surrogate reasoning. Talking about truth, falsity, and por-
3 We repeat that this does not mean that we propose to abandon the scientific realism of theories. We 
can use a neutral logical apparatus for the generation of hypotheses, independently of the theoretical 
assumptions that underlie the epistemological approach within which the modeling practice is carried 
out.
4 In another article we have argued that this interactive relationship, to be captured correctly, requires 
an appropriate dynamic and interactive theoretical approach (cf. Redmond, 2021).
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tions of reality bring us to —from a logical point of view— the most consolidated logical 
frame in science: classical logic. Our objective is to expose the ontological commitments 
at the base of this frame and to align ourselves with the critique mainly made by Lambert 
(2003) and Bencivenga (1986) and their proposal of a free logic. According to this, now we 
introduce general insights about the semantic of classical logic and then the critics from the 
free logic perspective5.
For the semantic of classical logic, following Shapiro and Kouri Kissel (2018), we have:
— A set of non-logical terminology K.
— An interpretation for the language L1K= is a structure M = 〈d, I〉
• d is a non-empty set, called the domain-of-discourse
• I is an interpretation function.
And one of the most relevant features of this semantics is that.
If k1 is a constant in K, then I(k1) is a member of the domain d.
Thus, as the authors signalized, every constant denotes something. Systems, where this 
is not assumed, are called free logics. The two logical principles that reflect this compromise 
are (i) “the principle of Existential Generalization (EG): Fb → ∃x(Fx), i.e., If b is F, then 
there is something that is F. The second principle —as Reicher signalizes (2019)— is “less 
prominent, rather seldom explicitly stated, but often tacitly assumed.” This is about the 
Predication Principle (PP): Fb → ∃x(x = b) , i.e., If b is F, then b exists / there is some-
thing identical with b.
These two principles, when present in scientific discourse, especially in modeling, lead 
to consequences that in some cases contradict hard empirical facts and trivial truths about 
the ontological status of the portions of the world implicated. Let us consider the follow-
ing case as an example of the difficulties that may result from not properly considering the 
applicability of the underlying logic. The planetary model created to explain the anomalies 
in Mercury’s orbit (the 43 arcsecond variation that had been detected at the perihelion of 
the planet Mercury), and which included a planet between itself and the sun: Vulcan (cf. 
Levenson, 2017). No doubt the model explained well what was observed, just as the plan-
etary model of the atom allows a good understanding of the phenomena through Cou-
lomb’s law for electric charges. But in both cases, the success of the models is not a proof 
of the existence of that to which the model was aiming. But the latter contradicts the se-
mantics of classical logic. In effect, for the Vulcan case, according to the semantics of classi-
cal logic, there must be at least one individual ki who satisfies the properties assigned to the 
model: ‘A = ki is a planet between the Sun and Mercury and produces disturbances in Mer-
cury’s orbit’. But at the same time, from the assertion that such an individual fulfills such a 
property (Ak1), we can infer —according to the principles that govern classical logic— that 
there must exist at least one individual with this property: Ak1 → ∃xAx (Specification, i.e., 
the existential quantifier ranging over the domain of existing beings). But if we transfer 
this outcome to the phenomena (the target of the model), it will lead to a predictable fail-
ure. But the interesting thing is that the failure is not due to a problem of the standard of 
5 In this sense we reject Levy’s idea that a model, sometimes, is proposed in a non-committal spirit 
(Levy, 2014, p. 797). Especially from an inferential point of view, using classical logic there is no way 
out of its ontologically committed semantic.
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adequacy and the possibility of misrepresentation. This is a case where we apply the wrong 
logic. For if, as in the case of anomalies in the orbit of Mercury, we model a portion of real-
ity that that is unknown to us and that we do not have certainty about the existence or not 
of entities in it, we cannot use a logic with ontological commitments for its singular terms 
(ki). A Free Logic, from our point of view, is the most prominent frame that acknowledged 
this problem. In effect, Free Logic aims to invalidate specification and particularization, 
both. The result is a logic free of ontological commitments. Our contribution (below) fol-
lows these insights.
5. A dynamic point of view of targetless
Now, taking another step in the direction of our proposal, we would like to offer a dynamic 
point of view of targetless. In order to achieve our objective, we will take into account the 
following two elements: the first is to understand targetless as a case of ontological inde-
terminacy (epistemic gap), that is present in specific cases of the practice of modeling. The 
second aspect, which relies on the first one, aims at integrating this indeterminacy into the 
inferential process that accomplishes the model. Both elements can be achieved, from our 
point of view, only using a free logic for the generation of hypothesis from the model (sur-
rogate reasoning). That is, in other words, a neutral logic is justified especially in cases in 
which ontologically uncertain phenomena are modeled. Modeling portions of the world 
that are ontologically uncertain is more common than you might think and is perhaps the 
most challenging and enriching part of scientific modeling.
In general, we believe that we speak of ontologically uncertain phenomena in the fol-
lowing cases:
i) we know there is something but we don’t really know what it’s like [If we think, 
for example, of the different shapes given to the atom from Dalton to Bohr];
ii) we don’t know if there is something or not [if we think of the Planetary Model 
that proposed the planet Vulcan between Mercury and the Sun];
iii) we know that such a thing doesn’t exist [models of perfect agents (perfect agents 
doesn’t exist)].
Of course, these are special cases of modeling, but especially in these cases, we believe that 
the caution or parsimony that should characterize the experimentation with observables 
and non-observables (and especially cases i, ii, and iii), should be reflected inferentially in 
the use of a neutral frame.6 The final corroboration or proof of the existence or non-exist-
ence of something must be considered out of definitely outside the inferential scheme of 
proposing hypotheses about the target system.7 But the inferential basis of surrogate rea-
soning cannot be indifferent to the absence of this corroboration or proof.
6 A neutral logic such as the one we propose would provide us with a deflationary and/or minimalist al-
ternative with respect to the truth (cf. Contessa, 2007; Suárez, 2015), offering the ludic semantics (game 
theory) of Dialogic Logic as an alternative to a referentialist semantics such as that of classical logic. 
7 This does not mean that realism is abandoned, that is, it can continue to be defended despite the neu-
trality of the ontologically neutral action of proposing hypotheses. Otherwise modeling would logi-
cally become a machine to produce existing ones: we make a model on a computer, then verify experi-
mentally one of its hypotheses and its target would instantly appear in reality (Ex Nihilo Fiat).
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It should be noted that, by their subrogating character, the conclusions drawn in a 
model are also, as hypotheses, claims about the ontologically problematic portion to which 
the model points. But once the hypothesis has been positively corroborated, it would be a 
mistake to say that what is true in the model is also true in reality. And this is due, as we 
pointed out above, to the referentialist semantics that underlies the notion of truth in clas-
sical logic. For example, it is quite possible to positively corroborate hypotheses obtained 
from a model consisting of a frictionless plane. But it seems unacceptable that we should 
therefore conceive that there exists such an impossible thing as a frictionless plane. The 
same applies to other types of unrealistic models that Frigg gathers in the following list 
(2010, p. 257): Frictionless planes, spherical planets, infinitely extended condenser plates, 
infinitely high potential wells, massless strings, populations living in isolation from their 
environment, animals reproducing at a constant rate, perfectly rational agents, markets 
without transaction costs.
From our point of view, then, targetless would mean that the model points to ontolog-
ically uncertain phenomena and that this fact must be taken into account in the inferential 
function of the model (surrogate reasoning), which justifies the use of a neutral logic. In 
the following, we present the dialogical frame for an ontologically neutral logic.
6. Modeling from a logical point of view
In this section, we will develop an ontologically neutral logic for the surrogate function 
that is inferentially fulfilled by the models. We have chosen the approach of dialogical prag-
matism for this purpose. In effect, we think that in general the process of modeling could 
be better understood as an interactive process. The agents of the interaction, in our pro-
posal, are the model and the target system, and the dynamic approach of dialogics could il-
luminate aspects that are lost in other static points of view.
We will develop this section in two parts. In the first part (I) we will present the dia-
logic frame and in the second part (II) we will present a Free Dialogical Logic (FDL).
(I) The dialogical frame8
Dialogues are mathematically defined language games that establish the interface between 
the concrete linguistic activity and the formal notion of demonstration. Two interlocutors 
(Proponent and Opponent) exchange movements that are concretely linguistic acts. The 
Proponent enunciates a thesis, the thesis of the dialogue, and undertakes to defend it by re-
sponding to all the opponent’s criticisms. The allowed criticisms are defined in terms of the 
structure of the statements affirmed in the dialogue. For example, if a player affirms con-
junction A and B, at the same time he gives the opponent the possibility to choose one of 
the two and to demand that he affirm it. The very notion of asserting is defined by the con-
text of critical interaction: asserting means committing oneself to provide justification to a 
critical interlocutor. But in dialogues there is no general theory of justification but only in-
sofar as they are logically complex statements that find their justification from simple state-
8 For a more detailed presentation see the Appendix at the end of this article.
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ments. In turn, simple statements are justified in reciprocal action with the critical inter-
locutor. That is, as the rule exhorts, the Proponent may consider an elementary statement 
justified, if and only if the Opponent has granted that justification. This rule confirms the 
formality of the dialogues: the Proponent wins without presupposing justifications for any 
particular statement.
A formal dialog (Keiff, 2011) follows two kinds of rules: rules of particles and struc-
tural rules according to the following extension of the first-order language:
FO[τ], as the result of enriching a first-order language over vocabulary τ with the fol-
lowing metalogical symbols:
i) two force symbols, ? and !;
ii) the symbols 1, 2, ∀x/c, ∃x (where x and c stand, respectively, for any variable and 
any constant of the vocabulary τ);
iii) two labels, O and P (standing for the players, Opponent and Proponent, respec-
tively).
Particle or local rules
The particle rules constitute the local semantics of a logic, for they determine the di-
alogical meaning of each logical constant. They abstractly describe the way a formula of a 
given main connective may be objected to (challenge), and how to answer the objection 
(defense). Particle rules make no reference to the context of argumentation in which the 
rule is applied. But they are intrinsically dependent on the notion of dialogue, since they 
describe sequences of language acts.
An example for the conjunction (∧):
Assert Challenge Defense
∧ X-!-A∧B Y-?-1 or Y-?-2 X-!-A resp. X-!-B
Structural or global rules
In the same way as particle rules describe the local meaning of the logical constants, 
structural rules determine their global semantics leading the general organization of the di-
alogues. The structural rules are meant to organize the application of the particle rules in 
such a way that the set of moves resulting from the application of the rules to an initial for-
mula (called the thesis) yields a dialogue that can be seen as a valid argument for the thesis.
A particular development of both of these rules will be given below for a targetless Dia-
logical Logic.
Crucial to the dialogic approach are the following points
1. The distinction between local meaning (rules for logical constants) and global 
meaning (included in structural rules).
2. Rules for anonymous players for local meaning.
3. The distinction between the game level (local winning or game-winning) and the 
strategic level (existence of a winning strategy).
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4. A notion of validity equivalent to a winning strategy for P.
5. The notion of triumph in a formal game, rather than a winning strategy in a 
model.
Global Meaning
As mentioned above, the global sense is defined by structural rules that determine the 
general development of the games, specifying who starts, what movements are allowed and 
in what order, when a game ends, and who wins and when (see Appendix I). Structural 
rules include the following:
Formal Rule: P cannot affirm an elementary proposition unless O does so first. Elementary 
propositions cannot be attacked.
This rule is one of the most outstanding features of dialogic logic. As discussed in Marion 
and Rückert (2015), it goes back to Aristotle’s reconstruction of Platonic dialectics: the 
main idea is that, when an elementary proposition is challenged (attacked), then the only 
possible answer —from an argumentative point of view— is to appeal to the opponent’s 
concessions. That is, without making use of an authority beyond the movements presented 
during the argumentative interaction. In fact, one might see the formal rule as the imple-
mentation of a type of copying strategy: my reasons for asserting such a proposition are ex-
actly the same as yours when you granted the same proposition (cf. Rahman et al., 2009; 
Rahman and Keiff, 2010).
Now, if the ultimate foundations of a dialogical thesis are elementary propositions 
and if this is done through the use of the formal rule, then the dialogues are in this sense 
necessarily asymmetrical. In fact, if both contenders were restricted by the formal rule no 
elementary proposition could be asserted. Therefore, we implement the formal rule by 
designing a player, called the Proponent, whose statements of elementary propositions 
are restricted by this rule. It is the victory of the proponent that provides the dialogic no-
tion of validity. More precisely, in the dialogical approach, validity is defined through the 
notion of winning strategy, where winning strategy for X means that for any choice of 
movements of Y, X has at least one possible movement at its disposal, such that the (X) 
wins:
Validity (definition): A proposition is valid in a given dialogic system if and only if P 
has a formal winning strategy for this proposition.
(II) A free dialogical logic for surrogate reasoning
A Free Dialogical Logic (FDL) is a free and dynamic dialogical logic for abstract objects. 
FDL follows the general insights of the Free Logic developed by Karel Lambert (2003). 
The objective is to elaborate a logic that is free from the ontological commitments that 
generate Specification and Particularization in classical logic (Frege-Russell-Quine). It is 
dynamic because existence in FDL is an act of choice. In fact, dialogical logic distances it-
self from the use of predicates of existence (static perspective) and proposes a pragmatic ap-
proach to the notion of existence through the notion of use (Particle and Structural Rules).
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Our Free Dialogical Logic has three sources:
i) The notion of introduction coming from Frege’s Nightmare (Rahman et al., 1997; 
Rahman, 2001).
ii) The notion of symbolic status of Hugh MacColl (1906).
iii) The notion of ontological dependency coming from the notion of Artefacts devel-
oped by Amie Thomasson (1999).
(i) Frege’s Nightmare and introduced constants
Frege’s Nightmare was the name of a dialogical formulation developed by Shahid Rah-
man (2001) that collects and continues results published in Rahman et  al. (1997). This 
new perspective proposes to place restrictions on the introduction of constants in the con-
text of quantification. Therefore, constants would have a formal use and would allow the 
development of a paraconsistent and intuitionistic dialogical logic. The device with which 
this restriction is executed using a special structural rule called the “rule of introduction”. 
This rule stipulated —in the dialogical frame— the interaction between choices and prop-
ositions and was the first attempt to invalidate Specification and Particularisation with the 
unwanted consequence that all formulas starting with an existential quantifier are inva-
lid. For the development of TDL in the present article we will avoid these undesired con-
sequences by incorporating specific devices: the notions of dependency and symbolic con-
stants.
Rule of Introduction:9 Let us say that the singular term ki played by X has been intro-
duced if:
1. X brings forward φ[x/ki] to defend an existential expression of the form ∃xφ
2. X attacks ∀xφ with < ?-x/ki >, where ki does not occur in the play before.
[introduced constants]: This rule, then, allows us to define an introduced constant as that 
which comes from 1 or 2.
In general terms, the notion of introduction makes it possible to recognize those con-
stants that are under the scope of classical quantifiers or loaded ontologically.
(ii) Symbolic status of constants
Symbolic Constants are those in principle that are outside the scope of quantifiers. 
Since they are beyond the scope of classical quantifiers, we sustain that we do not know 
if they are ontologically charged or not. It is a moment of epistemic indetermination that 
the Scottish logician Hugh MacColl (1906) capture in his logical language by the notion 
of “symbolic constants”. MacColl postulates a kind of logic of non-existence that contem-
plates a symbolic domain of individuals. It introduces two mutually complementary classes: 
the class of existing beings (e1, e2, ...) and the class of non-existent beings (01, 02, ...). But at 
the same time, it speaks of a third class called “symbolic” and the latter would include the 
two precedents. A symbolic individual could be existing or non-existent.]
9 In previous versions (cf. Rahman et al,, 1997; Rahman, 2001) only O could introduce constants.
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[symbolic constants]: a symbolic constant is one that appears in the thesis or played 
by P, but never introduced.
(iii) Ontological dependency
To implement the notion of dependence in dialogic we introduce, then, the predi-
cate of dependency relationship D to which we will give a specific semantics: Dkikj (ki de-
pends ontologically on kj). This predicate of dependency was inspired by the work of Amie 
Thomasson (1999) who proposed it to give identity conditions to non-existent beings. The 
idea is that if a constant ki must count as a nonexistent, it must be inscribed in an ontolog-
ical dependency relation with respect to constant kj that corresponds to an existing object 
(independently). This notion helps us to distinguish between existing objects and non-ex-
istent objects. By definition we say, that non-existent objects are dependent while existing 
ones are independent.
Dkikj y ki = kj if and only if ki(kj) designates an existing object (independently).
Dkikj y ki ≠kj if and only if ki is a non-existent one that depends ontologically on kj such that 
Dkikj.
Rules for FDL
The Free Dialogical Logic (FDL) for targetless models we propose is developed in two 
phases: a symbolic stage and an actualist stage. Both phases are based on the same Particle 
Rules:






∨ X-!-A∨B Y-?-∨ X-!-A or X-!-B
→ X-!-A→B Y-!-A X-!-B
¬ X-!-¬A Y-!-A —
∀ X-∀xΦ Y-?[Φ(a/x)] X-Φ(a/x)
∃ X-∃xΦ Y-?-∃ X-Φ(ai/x)
Next, we will only give the rules for a first-order propositional system.
Structural rules for the symbolic stage of FDL
A play (or dialogue) is a sequence of moves that follows the game rules. The structural 
rules give the precise conditions under which a given sentence is a play. The dialogical game 
for φ, written D(φ), is the set of all plays with φ as the thesis (see the Starting rule below).
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The structural rules are the following:
SR-0 (Starting rule): The expressions of a dialogue are numbered, and are alter-
nately stated by P and O. The thesis is number 0, and is asserted by P. All moves follow-
ing the thesis are responses to a move played by another player, and obeying particle rules 
and other structural rules. D(A) is called a dialogue that starts with thesis A, even moves are 
moves made by P, odd moves are made by O.
From here the player chooses to play according to classic rules (SR-1cl) or intuitionist 
rules (SR-1i).
SR-1i (Intuitionistic game-playing rule): With each move, each player can either 
challenge a complex formula stated by the other player, or defend himself from the last 
challenge against which he has not yet defended himself. You can wait to defend yourself 
against a challenge while there are still challenges to play. If it is X’s turn to play the move 
n, and Y has played two challenges with moves l and m (with l<m<n), to which X has not 
yet replied, X can no longer defend himself against l. In short, one can only defend oneself 
against the last challenge not yet defended.
Example: we have Y=O and X=P
O P
l challenge No answer
m challenge No answer n
In the movements that follow m it is not 
possible to respond to the challenge l
SR-1cl (Classical game-playing rule): At each move, each player can either challenge a 
complex formula stated by the other player, or defend himself against any challenge by the 
other player (including those to which he has already responded).
SR-2 (Branching rule): O generates two separate dialogues when it makes the follow-
ing choices:
1. Defend a disjunction.
2. Challenge a conjunction.
3. Respond to the challenge of a conditional.
Each of these choices gives a new branch, that is, a new part. However, the choices of the 
Proponent do not generate new branches.
SR-3 (Formal rule): The proponent may not introduce atomic formulas: any atomic 
formula in a dialogue must first be introduced by the opponent. To challenge atomic for-
mulas is not allowed.
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SR-4 (Ranking rule): Opponent and the Proponent successively choose a positive in-
teger called repetition rank. The role of these integers is to ensure that every play ends af-
ter finitely many moves by setting the player’s repetition rank as the maximum number of 
times he can challenge or defend against a given move of the other player.
SR-5 (On symbolic constants): the Proponent defends an existential quantifier or at-
tacks a universal quantifier with symbolic constants or already introduced by the opponent.
Symbolic constants = in the thesis or played by P but never introduced.
SR-6 Winning Rule: A dialog is closed if, and only if, it contains two occurrences of 
the same atomic formula, labeled X and Y respectively. Otherwise, the dialogue remains 
open. The player who has stated the thesis wins the dialogue if and only if the dialogue is 
closed. A dialog is finished if and only if it is closed, or if the rules (structural and particle 
rules) do not allow any other moves. The player who played the role of opponent won the 
dialogue if and only if the dialogue is finished and open.
Finished and closed: the proposer wins.
Finished and open: the opponent wins.
Definition of Validity: A thesis A is said to be dialogically valid (in classical or intui-
tionist logic) when all games of the dialogue D(A) are closed.
10
Structural rules for the actualist phase of FDL
This stage begins with the attack from O to P in respect of the dependencies of the 
constants used. For this purpose, it is stated that:
— To attack the dependency relationship, the proposer must win the first stage of the 
game (dialog symbolically terminated) according to:
Definition: We say that a dialog is symbolically finished if and only if the dialog is 
closed and finished according to the rules of the symbolic stage.
According to the above, we have the following rule:
(RD-0) X can only challenge the ontological dependency relation by application of (RD-1)-
(RD-5) once the symbolic phase has ended and on the last atomic formula played by Y.
Definition: (i) We call “symbolic” the phase in which the symbolic status of the ob-
jects to which the constants played correspond has not yet been specified by the application 
10 It is possible to prove that the dialogical definition of validity coincides with the standard definition. 
The first formulations of the evidence were developed by Kuno Lorenz in his PhD thesis (repeated in 
Lorenzen and Lorenz, 1978). Felscher (1985) proved equivalence with first-order intuitionist logic (by 
demonstrating the correspondence between intuitionist dialogues and the intuitionist sequent calcu-
lus); while Stegmüller (1964) established equivalence in the case of classical first-order logic. Rahman 
(1993, pp. 88-107), who developed the idea that dialogues for validity could be seen as a theory of ev-
idence structure for constructing tableau systems, directly proved the equivalence between the two 
types of dialogues and the corresponding semantic tableau, from which the result extends to the corre-
sponding sequent calculus.
 Juan Redmond
310 Theoria, 2021, 36/3, 297-320
of the rules (RD-1)-(RD-5); (ii) we call “actualist” the phase in which we apply the rules 
(RD-1)-(RD-5).
(RD-1) when X plays an atomic formula containing a ki, Y can challenge X with the follow-
ing question: “?-Dkikj”, i.e., ask for the kind of ontological dependence on ki (dependent [ki = kj] 











n+1 ? - Dk1kj n Dk1kj n+2
(RD-2) when X plays an atomic formula containing a ki and that the same ki has been used 
by X to defend an existential quantifier or to attack a universal quantifier (introduced), Y 
may ask him “?-Dkiki” Y may demand that he justifies that ki is in a relation of reflexive de-
pendence, i.e., that ki exists independently. X defends itself justifying the relation of reflex-
ive dependence: Dkiki.
(RD-3) when X concedes an ontological dependence relation Dkikj with ki ≠ kj, that is 
to say that ki is a non-existent that depends on kj, it concedes at the same time Dkjkj.
Corollary of the formal rule (RS-3): P does not have the right to introduce an onto-
logical dependency relationship.
If the Proponent has won in the first part (symbolic phase) and there is a branching, 
the opponent has the right to question the status of the objects corresponding to the con-
stants played at the end of each branching. For example:
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O P
(Ak1∧∃xAx → ∃x(Ax∧∃xAx) 0
1 Ak1∧∃xAx 0 ∃x(Ax∧∃xAx) 2
3 ?-$ 2 Ak1∧∃xAx 4
5 ?∧1 4 5’ ?∧2 4 Ak1 8 ∃xAx 8’
7 Ak1 7’ ∃xAx 1 ?∧1 6 1 ?∧2 6’
9 ?-Dk2kj 8 9’ ?-∃ 8’ Ak2 ☺ 12’
11’ Ak2 7’ ?-∃ 10’
13’ ? - Dk2k2 12’(8’)
(RD-4) X can update a constant (repeat the defence of an existential quantifier or the chal-
lenge on a universal quantifier) if and only if Y has introduced a new constant of which X 
can be served or that Y has granted this constant in a reflexive ontological dependency rela-
tionship (Dkiki).
Definition: We say that X symbolically confers an atomic formula when in the sym-
bolic phase it defends itself from a challenge ?-ki of Y (on a universal quantifier) by affirm-
ing an atomic formula ϕ[x/ki].
(RD-5) when X has symbolically conceded an atomic formula ϕ[x/ki] which is then 
determined to be a dependent object in the actualist phase, then X can annul the conces-
sion of the atomic formula ϕ[x/ki], i.e. the concession had no value until the quantifiers 
were interpreted in an actualist manner.
We have then that a symbolic constant is one for which the ontological status of the 
corresponding entity continues to be indeterminate (as dependent or independent).
Definition: We will call “symbolic” a totally new constant played by P, a constant that 
appears in the initial thesis or introduced by the opponent, and that continues indetermi-
nate according to the rules (RD-1)-(RD-5).
Let’s see as examples the cases of Specification and Particularization:
O P
Ak1→∃xAx 0
1 Ak1 0 ∃xAx 2
3 ?-∃ 2 Ak1 4
5 ?-Dk1k1 4(3)
7 Dk1k2 ☺ 1 ?-Dk1ki 6
 Juan Redmond
312 Theoria, 2021, 36/3, 297-320
O P
∀xAx → Ak1 0
1 ∀xAx 0 Ak1 4
3 [Ak1] 1 ?k1 2
5 ?-Dk1k1 4(2)
7 Dk1k2 3 ? - Dk1ki 6
9 Ak2☺ 1 ?k2 8
For the case of Smullyan’s formulae:
O P
∃x(Ax → ∀xAx) 0
1 ?-∃ 0 Ak1 → ∀xAx 2
3 Ak1 2 ∀xAx 4
5 ? k2 4 Ak2 8
Ak2 → ∀xAx 6
7 Ak2 6
9 ?-Dk2k2 8(1) Dk2k2☺ 12




1 Ak1 0 Ak1 2
3 ?-Dk1kj 2 Dk1k1 /Dk1k2
☺
5 Dk1k1 /Dk1k2 1 ?-Dk1kj 4
P wins on the symbolic stage: the thesis has a winning strategy for indeterminate constants 
(symbolic). Later P wins the actualist stage, then the thesis has a winning strategy for exist-
ent and non-existent beings: in 5, O can answer either of the two (Dk1k1 or Dk1k2).
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O P
∃x(Ax → Ax) 0
1 ?-∃ 0 Ak1 → Ak1 2
3 Ak1 2 Ak1 4
5 ?-Dk1k1 4(0)
7 Dk1k2 ☺ 3 ?-Dk1x 6
In the latter case, specification, P does not have a winning strategy at the actualist stage.
Other existential formulas do have EG as is the case of Smullyan that we saw above.
The following case corresponds to an identity, P wins at the actualist stage.
O P
∃xAx →∃xAx 0
1 ∃xAx 0 ∃xAx 2
3 ?-∃ 2 Ak1 6
5 Ak1 1 ?-∃ 4
7 ?-Dk1k1 6(2) Dk1k1 ☺ 10




1 Ak1 0 ∀x(Ax→Ak1) 2
3 ?k2 2 Ak2→Ak1 4
5 Ak2 4 Ak1 6
7 ?-Dk1x 6 Dk1k1 /Dk1k2
☺
10
9 Dk1k1 /Dk1k2 1 ?-Dk1x 8
Some final remarks on targetless models and FDL
The ki constants of the FDL object language correspond to parts of the model or to the 
model itself. For example, when we infer from M that k1 verifies Ak1 → ∀x(Ax → Ak1), 
(A  being a relevant property of M), we are at the same time formulating a hypothesis 
about the phenomena to which the model points. In this sense, for targetless models (ac-
cording to i, ii or iii), we believe that the ki mentioned corresponds to the constants of the 
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first stage of FDL: the symbolic stage. Indeed, it is worth noting that there is a parallelism 
between the ontological status of the entities considered as symbolic by Hugh MacColl 
(1906) and the ontologically uncertain phenomena to which the model points.
Thus, FDL has two complementary stages: a first stage (symbolic) where the winning 
strategies correspond to hypotheses formulated and defended on the phenomena without 
ontological commitments. In other words, in this first stage, the status of the singular terms 
in the affirmations (thesis) with winning strategies is symbolic. The second stage, the actu-
alist one, is a stage of discernment and determination. In effect, it is the information that 
allows us to discern between existent and non-existent beings (captured in FDL as depend-
ent and non-dependent). The most relevant part of this information is that it allows us to 
detect deceptive inferential steps, that is, those that would lead us to formulate (errone-
ously) committed ontological hypotheses about ontologically uncertain phenomena, such 
as Ak1 → ∃xAx (Specification).
Conclusions
The aim of this article was to develop a Free Dialogic Logic (FDL) that offers necessary 
conditions to address the logical difficulties presented when modeling ontologically uncer-
tain phenomena. We have focused especially on the case of classical logic because it is one 
of the most widespread and widely used logical frames in science. The difficulties that arise 
when modeling ontologically uncertain phenomena are mainly due to the restrictions and 
limitations imposed by the semantics of classical logic. We show in our article that with-
out these considerations the inferential function fulfilled by the model through surrogate 
reasoning leads to erroneous statements about the ontological status of the phenomena to 
which the model points. Indeed, the most relevant part of the information that delivers 
FDL is that it allows us to detect deceptive inferential steps. For example, in the case of the 
generation of committed ontological hypotheses due to Ak1 → ∃xAx (Specification).
The structure of our FDL has two complementary phases: a first stage (symbolic) 
where the winning strategies correspond to hypotheses formulated and defended on a tar-
get system without ontological commitments. The second stage, the actualist one, is a stage 
of discernment that allows us to put down all the formulas that would commit us to the 
ontological status of the phenomena.
Finally, we would like to point out that a consequence of this view on the modeling of 
ontologically uncertain phenomena is that it should be considered separately from the tar-
get system (cf. Cassini, 2018). We believe that while the former is a part of the phenomena 
and could be absent as proposed by the model, the latter, the target system, can be consid-
ered as a hypothetical complement that is elaborated at the same time with the model. This 
separation would prevent the modeling process from being invalidated in the face of the 
uncertain ontological condition of what the model is targeting. As we pointed out above, 
the recognition of a problematic target in phenomena and the elaboration of the respective 
model is a crucial part of the modeling process and we believe it is worth developing in a fu-
ture article.
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Appendix: Standard Dialogical Logic11
Let L be a first-order language built as usual upon the propositional connectives, the quan-
tifiers, a denumerable set of individual variables, a denumerable set of individual constants 
and a denumerable set of predicate symbols (each with a fixed arity).
We extend the language L with two labels O and P, standing for the players of the 
game, and the question mark ‘?’. When the identity of the player does not matter, we use 
variables X or Y (with X≠Y). A move is an expression of the form ‘X-e’, where e is either a 
formula φ of L or the form ‘?[φ1, ..., φn]’.
We now present the rules of dialogical games. There are two distinct kinds of rules 
named particle (or local) rules and structural rules. We start with the particle rules.
Previous move X-φ∧ψ X-φ∨ψ X-φ→ψ X-¬φ
Challenge Y-?[φ] orY-?[ψ] Y-?[φ,ψ] Y-φ Y-φ
Defence X-φresp. X-ψ
X-φ
or X-ψ X-ψ —
11 The following brief presentation of standard dialogical logic is due to Nicolas Clerbout. The main 
original articles on dialogical logic are collected in Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978). For an historical over-
view see Lorenz (2001). Other articles have been collected more recently in Lorenz (2008, 2010a, 
2010b). A detailed account of recent developments since, say, Rahman (1993) and Felscher (1994), 
can be found in Rahman and Keiff (2005) and Keiff (2011). For the underlying metalogic see Cler-
bout (2013a, 2013b). For a textbook presentation: Rückert (2011). For the key role of dialogic in re-
gaining the link between dialectics and logic, see Rahman and Keiff (2010). Fiutek et al. (2010) study 
the dialogical approach to belief revision. Clerbout et  al. (2011) studied Jain Logic in the dialogical 
framework. Popek (2012, pp. 223-244) develops a dialogical reconstruction of medieval obligationes. 
See also Magnier (2013) —on dynamic epistemic logic and legal reasoning in a dialogical framework. 
Rahman et al. (2018) studied Immanent reasoning or equality in action.
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Previous move X-∀xφ X-∃xφ
Challenge Y-?[φ(a/x)] Y-?[φ(a1/x), ... ,φ(an/x)]
Defence X-φ(a/x) X-φ(ai/x)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
In this table, the ais are individual constants and φ(ai/x) denotes the formula obtained by 
replacing every occurrence of x in φ by ai. When a move consists in a question of the form 
‘?[φ1,  ..., φn]’, the other player chooses one formula among φ1,  ..., φn and plays it. We can 
thus distinguish between conjunction and disjunction on the one hand, and universal and 
existential quantification on the other hand, in terms of which player has a choice. In the 
cases of conjunction and universal quantification, the challenger chooses which formula he 
asks for. Conversely, in the cases of disjunction and existential quantification, the defender 
is the one who can choose between various formulas. Notice that there is no defence in the 
particle rule for negation.
Particle rules provide an abstract description of how the game can proceed locally: they 
specify the way a formula can be challenged and defended according to its main logical con-
stant. In this way we say that these rules govern the local level of meaning. Strictly speaking, 
the expressions occurring in the table above are not actual moves because they feature for-
mulas schemata and the players are not specified. Moreover, these rules are indifferent to 
any particular situations that might occur during the game. For these reasons we say that 
the description provided by the particle rules is abstract. The words “challenge” and “de-
fence” are convenient to name certain moves according to their relationship with other 
moves. Such relationships can be precisely defined in the following way. Let S be a sequence 
of moves. The function p∑ assigns a position to each move in ∑, starting with 0. The func-
tion F∑ assigns a pair [m,Z] to certain moves N in ∑, where m denotes a position smaller 
than p∑(N) and Z is either C or D, standing respectively for “challenge” and “defence”. 
That is, the function F∑ keeps track of the relations of challenge and defence as they are 
given by the particle rules. A play (or dialogue) is a legal sequence of moves, i.e., a sequence 
of moves which observes the game rules. The rules of the second kind that we mentioned, 
the structural rules, give the precise conditions under which a given sentence is a play. The 
dialogical game for φ, written D(φ), is the set of all plays with φ as the thesis (see the Start-
ing rule below). The structural rules are the following:




In other words, any play π in D(φ) starts with P-φ. We call φ the thesis of the play and of 
the dialogical game. After that, the Opponent and the Proponent successively choose a pos-
itive integer called repetition rank. The role of these integers is to ensure that every play 
ends after finitely many moves, in a way specified by the next structural rule.
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SR1 (Classical game-playing rule)
— Let π ∈ D(φ). For every M in π with pπ(M)  >  2 we have Fπ(M)  =  [m’,Z] with 
m’<pπ(M) and Z ∈ {C,D}
— Let r be the repetition rank of player X and π ∈ D(φ) such that
• the last member of π is a Y move,
• M0 is a Y move of position m0 in π,
• M1, ..., Mn are X moves in π such that Fπ(M1) = ... = Fπ(Mn) = [m0,Z].
Consider the sequence12 π’  = π*N where N is an X move such that Fπ’(N) = [m0,Z]. We 
have π’ ∈ D(φ) only if n < r.
The first part of the rule states that every move after the choice of repetition ranks is ei-
ther a challenge or a defence. The second part ensures finiteness of plays by setting the play-
er’s repetition rank as the maximum number of times he can challenge or defend against a 
given move of the other player.
SR2 (Formal rule) Let y be an elementary sentence, N be the move P-ψ and M be the move 
O-ψ. A sequence p of moves is a play only if we have: if N ∈ π then M ∈ π and pπ(M) < pπ(N).
A play is called terminal when it cannot be extended by further moves in compliance with 
the rules. We say it is X terminal when the last move in the play is an X move.
SR3 (Winning rule) Player X wins the play p only if it is X terminal.
Consider for example the following sequences of moves: P-Qa → Qa, O-n: = 1, P-m: = 12, 
O-Qa, P-Qa.
We often use a convenient table notation for plays. For example, we can write this play 
as follows:
O P
Qa → Qa 0
1 n:=1 m:=12 2
3 Qa (0) Qa 4
The numbers in the external columns are the positions of the moves in the play. 
When a move is a challenge, the position of the challenged move is indicated in the 
internal columns, as with move 3 in this example. Notice that such tables carry the in-
formation given by the functions p and F in addition to represent the play itself.
However, when we want to consider several plays together —or example when build-
ing a strategy— such tables are not that perspicuous. So we do not use them to deal with di-
alogical games for which we prefer another perspective. The extensive form of the dialogical 
game D(φ) is simply the tree representation of it, also often called the game-tree. More pre-
cisely, the extensive form Eφ of D(φ) is the tree (T,I,S) such that:
12 We use π*N to denote the sequence obtained by adding move N to the play π.
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i) Every node t in T is labelled with a move occurring in D(φ)
ii) I: T → N
iii) S ⊆ T 2 with:
— There is a unique t0 (the root) in T such that I(t0) = 0, and t0 is labelled with the 
thesis of the game.
— For every t ≠ t0 there is a unique t’ such that t’St.
— For every t and t’ in T, if tSt’ then I(t’) = I(t)+1.
— Given a play p in D(φ) such that pπ(M’)  =  pπ(M)+1 and t, t’ respectively la-
belled with M and M’, then tSt’.
A strategy for Player X in D(φ) is a function which assigns an X move M to every non ter-
minal play π with a Y move as last member such that extending π with M results in a play. 
An X strategy is winning if playing according to it leads to X’s victory no matter how Y 
plays.
A strategy can be considered from the viewpoint of extensive forms: the extensive form 
of an X strategy s in D(φ) is the tree-fragment Eφ,σ = (Tσ, Iσ, Sσ) of Eφ such that:
i) The root of Eφ,σ is the root of Eφ.
ii) Given a node t in Eφ labelled with an X move, we have that tSσt’ whenever tSt’.
iii) Given a node t in Eφ labelled with a Y move and with at least one t’ such that tSt’, 
then there is a unique s(t) in Tσ where tSσs(t) and s(t) is labelled with the X move 
prescribed by s.
Here are some examples of results which pertain to the level of strategies13.
1. Winning P strategies and leaves. Let w be a winning P strategy in D(φ). Then every 
leaf in Eφ,w is labelled with a P signed atomic sentence.
2. Determinacy. There is a winning X strategy in D(φ) if and only if there is no winning 
Y strategy in D(φ).
3. Soundness and Completeness of Tableaux. Consider first-order tableaux and 
first-order dialogical games. There is a tableau proof for φ if and only if there is a win-
ning P strategy in D(φ).
By soundness and completeness of the tableau method with respect to model-theoretical 
semantics, it follows that existence of a winning P strategy coincides with validity: There is 
a winning P strategy in D(φ) if and only if φ is valid.
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